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In 2011, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) established a research unit at the Naval Postgraduate 
School to plan and conduct strategic and future-oriented research studies — The Project on Advanced  
Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) was born. These studies sup-
port DTRA’s mission to counter the full spectrum of threats posed by WMD.
The creation of PASCC marked a transformation in the way DTRA sponsors research on emerging WMD 
challenges, to be more efficient and effective in helping policymakers tackle tough issues.
Roots in Forward-Looking Research PASCC is based in Monterey, California. At the nexus of the academic 
and military worlds, the project is housed at the Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC) at the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS). The CCC serves as the program planning and implementation office, research center, 
and intellectual clearinghouse for PASCC. 
With over a decade’s experience providing forward-looking research and organizing international seminars 
and Track II dialogues, the CCC was a natural partner for the PASCC mission. CCC faculty in the Depart-
ment of National Security Affairs bring an array of expertise, academic tools, and research networks to 
deepen program outcomes. 
Delivering Answers to Tough Questions Understanding the predominance of inbox issues, PASCC is charged 
with issues that are not well understood or well developed in the existing literature. PASCC supports and awards 
projects that increase strategic analysis and foresight. The research links social science and technical domains to 
investigate and anticipate WMD capabilities, intentions and countermeasures 5 to 20 years out. 
Project success stems from research objectivity, accountability, and high-quality products that have immedi-
ate value to the government and the public. In today’s budget austerity, PASCC aids resource planning and 
forecasts for a broad set of government stakeholders. Some of the overarching research questions include: 
	 •	 	How	can	we	strengthen	cooperation	across	state	and	non-state	actors?




Merit-Based Project Selection PASCC sponsors innovative futures studies in collaboration with a diverse 
set of research partners. PASCC’s annual merit-based, peer-review process for selecting projects ensures that 
DTRA	and	other	stakeholders	benefit	from	the	most	rigorous	research	by	the	best	in	the	field.	Launching	the	
first	full	project	cycle	in	2012,	after	a	review	of	over	200	proposals,	NPS	gave	28	projects	awards	to	15	different	
institutions. Project awards totaled approximately $6,250,000. 
Examples of such research include “Anatomizing the Behavior of Chemical and Biological Non-State Adver-
saries,” a project examining the potential chemical or biological terrorist adversary from a behavioral and 
organizational standpoint, and the U.S.-China dialogues that increase mutual understanding and further 
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In 2011, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Kenneth Myers, ordered a transformation in 
the way DTRA sponsors research on emerging WMD challenges to be more efficient and effective in bringing 
the best research to the policy making process. DTRA created the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts 
for Countering WMD, referred to as PASCC, at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Center on Contemporary  
Conflict (CCC). The CCC is planning and executing the strategic studies and dialogues program. 
PASCC established new innovative mechanisms to fund research through competitively awarded grants. 
The value-add and cost-effectiveness of each proposal is taken into account. PASCC also supports organiza-
tions that are prohibited from direct competition but whose projects are deemed highly merit-worthy. As a 
result, DTRA funded approximately 30 studies through PASCC in fy12. About one-third of the awards fund 
strategic dialogues with important allies and partners to explore emerging WMD issues and areas for coop-
eration. The remaining two-thirds of awards support strategic research on future and emerging WMD threats, 
strategic stability, and options for managing related dangers. 
PASCC	has	the	mission	to	serve	the	public	with	valuable	findings,	conclusions,	and	recommendations	for	
countering the threats emanating from mass destruction technologies. Research products are shared at the 
maximum	level	possible	so	that	peer	researchers	and	the	broader	community	can	benefit	from	these	investi-
gative efforts. Through its peer-review evaluation and selection process, PASCC preserves research indepen-
dency and transparency. 
On July 19, 2012, NPS President Oliver signed the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between NPS and 
DTRA. The MOA formalized the transfer of the DTRA mission formerly executed by the Agency’s Advanced 
Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) to NPS. This agreement designates PASCC as DTRA’s “primary func-
tional program planning and implementation 
office, research unit, and intellectual clearing-
house for the execution of analysis and strategic 
engagement, subject to the guidance and ap-
proval	of	Director	(J2/5/8R),	on	future-oriented	
studies and dialogues.”(NPS-DTRA MOA page 
4 Subpar. 7d. (2)). DTRA, as the PASCC spon-
sor, provides all funding for the management 
and operation of PASCC, as well as programs 




























PASCC is directed by the Associate Chair for Research of the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA). 
This position is a rotating position held by a faculty member of the Department, usually for two years. The 
Associate Chair for Research also serves as the Director of the CCC. Since its inception, PASCC has been 
directed	by	Anne	L	Clunan,	Ph.D.,	an	Associate	Professor	in	the	NSA	Department.	
PASCC governance involves the Senior Steering Group (SSG), which assists the PASCC Director in setting 
research priorities. SSG membership consists of U.S. government experts on WMD and strategic issues. Over 
2011–2012, the SSG was chaired by the PASCC Director and included two representatives from DTRA, sub-
ject	matter	experts	from	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services,	the	U.S.	Air	Force	Strategic	Deter-
rence and Nuclear Integration division, and the U.S. Department of State, as well as faculty members from 
the National Defense University (NDU) and Naval Postgraduate School. The SSG meets biannually to provide 
strategic guidance and thought leadership to PASCC. 
The PASCC Director convenes a Proposal Review Committee during the annual 
evaluation of project proposals. The Proposal Review Committee is composed of 
U.S. government subject experts including two DTRA representatives, a detailee 
from the Department of State, and subject matter experts from the National De-
fense University and Naval Postgraduate School. The evaluation and review process 
is monitored by a non-voting DTRA representative to ensure that the review pro-
cess is impartial and transparent.
PASCC is supported by a partnership between NPS, DTRA, and NDU. Beginning 
in	February	2012,	program	advisement	from	the	National	Defense	University	fo-
cused on outreach and relationships with the diverse set of USG stakeholders. NDU 
faculty members also assist in monitoring project execution and facilitating or 
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ed a transition of DTRA’s strategic research and dialogues portfolio to PASCC, including external communi-
cations, alignment of staff, and an immediate solicitation of fy12 project ideas. PASCC was launched prior 
to	its	May	15	target	date,	holding	its	first	Senior	Steering	Group	Meeting,	issuing	the	request	for	fy12 ideas, 
and	completing	its	first	round	of	white	paper	reviews	by	May	19.	Throughout	its	first	year,	PASCC	laid	new	
groundwork in administrative and programmatic processes at NPS and with external partners. PASCC and 
DTRA	began	drafting	the	Memorandum	of	Agreement	governing	the	relationship	between	NPS	and	DTRA	
in April 2011; the MOA was executed in July 2012. 
Hiring In order to manage the portfolio of PASCC projects, including NPS and external performers, the CCC 
hired	a	new	full-time	Program	Manager.	The	CCC	also	hired	a	Finance	Associate	to	monitor	and	coordinate	finan-
cial transactions at the program and project level. These new staff members came on board on September 26, 2011.
Selection of fy12 Projects PASCC issued a request for ideas in May 2011. Over 220 white papers were 
received.	After	two	rounds	of	white	paper	review,	the	Proposal	Review	Committee	met	in	August	2011,	and	
achieved consensus on an evaluation and ranking of fy12 project submissions. The process led to 29 projects 
recommended for award. During fy12, PASCC issued its own Broad Area Announcement to invite propos-
als for fy13	awards	by	the	U.S.	Fleet	Logistics	Center,	San	Diego	(FLCSD).	This	BAA	“NPS-BAA-12–003”	is	
available at www.grants.gov by searching for the keyword PASCC. The full announcement details application 
procedures, eligibility, and the fy13 research priorities. 
Think	tanks,	other	universities,	Federally	Funded	Research	and	Development	Centers,	for-profit	organiza-
tions, and NPS faculty were eligible to submit projects for review. NPS faculty must compete for project fund-
ing in the same manner as all other competitive applicants. 
External Awards PASCC	awarded	18	external	(non-NPS	led)	projects	during	fy12. The majority of these 
projects are continuing into fy13. NPS does not have its own grant authority so it leverages an arrangement with 
the	FLCSD.	During	fy12, there were several delays in the grant award process stemming from government-wide 
conference	scrutiny	as	well	as	FLCSD’s	limited	staffing	experience	with	research	grants.	With	the	patience	of	all	
involved, awards were completed in July 2012. 
Quality Assurance PASCC leadership and staff routinely mitigated issues during project execution and en-
forced high standards for research quality. This activity included responsiveness to stakeholder needs, partici-
pation in international workshops, and review of project milestones. Beginning in 2011, the PASCC Director 
and Program Manager met with external awardees to discuss their projects and highlight PASCC expectations 
and processes for deliverables.
In addition to launching PASCC, per DTRA’s request, NPS established centralized oversight of the subset 
of ASCO-awarded fy10 and fy11 projects that were led by NPS-affiliated principal investigators. 
Knowledge Management PASCC inherited legacy materials from DTRA ASCO and developed solutions for 
archiving and releasing over 500 project reports to the public and U.S. government community. Many of these 
are	available	at	www.hsdl.org	or	www.dtic.mil.	The	PASCC	team	collaborates	with	the	NPS	Dudley	Knox	Library	
and maintains a Knowledge Management Plan to document these processes and the intersections of multiple 














Outreach One of the important responsibilities of PASCC is to market and distribute PASCC research in order 
to increase stakeholder interest and promote the value of research to the counter-WMD community. The PASCC 
Director met with offices at the National Nuclear Safety Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and 
other U.S. government (USG) agencies as well as private sector think tanks and foundations. Researchers briefed 
other USG policymakers in addition to DTRA. In September 2012, NPS in collaboration with NDU held the 
first	PASCC	research	colloquium	with	a	focus	on	Asia.	PASCC	also	developed	web	and	traditional	informational	
materials to increase awareness of project activities in the community. 
Sponsor Communications PASCC implemented regular reporting mechanisms to inform DTRA on all 
aspects of activity. These included monthly progress reports, meetings at DTRA and NPS, memorandums for 
the record, and regular conference calls. The PASCC team also regularly coordinates with NPS and external 




PASCC produces cutting-edge research, analysis and outreach to address critical issues of U.S. national and 
global security. The portfolio of projects link social science and technical domains to investigate and antici-
pate WMD capabilities, intentions, and countermeasures 5 to 20 years out. The research emphasizes the 
identification,	integration,	and	further	development	of	strategic	thinking	and	analysis	on	the	most	intractable	
and future problems related to combating WMD and weapons of mass effects (WME). Policymakers face new 
challenges in the areas of national defense, nuclear nonproliferation, and techno-
logical	and	scientific	advancements	with	respect	to	land,	sea,	cyber,	and	space.	The	
focus of PASCC is on whether and why states and non-state actors can tilt the bal-
ance of power and relative peace in the international arena. 
These research efforts seek to maximize understanding of anticipated or emerging 
issues	that	represent	the	full	spectrum	of	WMD	problems	or	have	the	significant	
potential to affect strategic stability. PASCC particularly supports research and 
analysis on issues that are not prominent or well developed in the existing litera-
ture. PASCC also seeks to balance research across a spectrum of strategic, applied, 
and technical topics and supports interdisciplinary research that combines these 
areas.	In	all	cases,	PASCC	is	interested	in	Western	and	non-Western	definitions	of	
WMD/WME issues; societal, organizational, and political responses to these issues; 
and the intersection of economic, social, political, military, and technological fac-
tors related to the emergence of threats from WMD use or proliferation. 
While a core research focus remains nuclear issues, PASCC has broad and sustained 
interest in non-nuclear aspects of WMD and threat reduction. Geographic areas of 
interest include established and non-established WMD states and regions that are 
potential sources or recipients of WMD materials, and their delivery systems. In the 
last decade, the emergence and resurgence of key countries with increasing economic 
and military capacity has brought new states in to the equation of maintaining peace 
and security. The rise of non-state actors and rapid advancements in the life, physical, 
and information sciences have expanded the potential threats and opportunities in 
Strategic Funding 
Opportunities
The PASCC grant to 
the Stimson Center’s 
Managing Across 
Boundaries program 
provided the seed for 
a million dollar effort 
that now combines 
funding from multiple 
sources. 
The project’s Task 
Force for Partners in 
Prevention brings 
























FISCAL YEAR 2012 IN REVIEW
The following timeline presents critical milestones and project events. Events associated with NPS-led fy10 and fy11 






















































































































































countering the weaponization of technological advances. This calls for new strategic approaches to maintaining 
a nuclear-free world, assuring our allies, and maintaining a strong and robust defense force ready to respond to 
existing and emerging threats.
PASCC projects awarded in fy12 have contributed key information to policymakers, USG officials and the 
public’s knowledge of emerging and perceived threats. This information includes opportunities for collaboration 
and	dialogue,	awareness	of	the	implication	of	new	scientific	and	technological	developments	in	the	private	sector	
on deterrence and nonproliferation policy, and continued efforts to dissuade non-nuclear states from acquiring 
nuclear weapons in the face of changing landscapes in regional politics.
The keys to PASCC’s success are research objectivity, responsiveness during project execution, and high-quality 




 1. 21st Century Deterrence, 
 2. Anticipating Threats and Opportunities, 
 3. Countering WMD/WME, 
 4. Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation Policy, and 
 5. Strategic Dialogues 
For	further	information	on	the	fy12 solicitation, please see Appendix A. Each 
project supports the DTRA mission to safeguard the United States and its allies 
from global WMD threats by integrating, synchronizing, and providing expertise, 
technologies,	and	capabilities	across	all	operating	environments.	The	findings	of	the	
studies and dialogues are published according to project timelines and briefed to 
selected experts and USG officials. 
Projects selected in fy12 deliver innovative, future-oriented and policy focused out-
comes	in	response	to	these	five	areas.	The	following	paragraphs	illustrate	a	sampling	
of PASCC projects, with a full listing provided below. 
21st Century Deterrence While the threat of global destruction through nuclear 
obliteration has decreased to a near-zero probability, the number and diversity of 
threats have increased. National security in the 21st century faces a host of new 
challenges stemming from changes in the rise of new global powers (China and In-
dia), rogue states, non-states actors, tactical nuclear weapons, and continued WMD 
proliferation calling for more coordinated efforts in meeting those challenges head 
on. PASCC research is offering new frameworks for understanding what drives the 
foreign policy decisions of states and the implications for deterrence planning and 
operations. Investigators are answering questions such as, is the concept of extend-
ed deterrence also applicable to space.
Anticipating Threats and Opportunities Growing numbers of countries are ac-
cessing space for both military and commercial purposes, opening new avenues 
for state and non-sate sponsored attacks on the U.S. and its allies. The interception 
of	different	sectors:	finance,	science,	technology	private	and	public	sectors	require	
a strong collaboration and partnerships between the public and private sectors. 
Projects	are	engaging	targeted	scientific	communities	abroad	to	address	gaps	in	
bio-surveillance and hosting international technical discussions to further develop 
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makers and policy experts broaden the scope of U.S. national security policy 
formulation and the incorporation of sectors once deemed non-national security 
specialties, such as the use of nuclear, biological and technical technologies in the 
private sector and the possibility that they can be sold in the black market. 
Countering WMD, WME New nuclear technologies, advancements in biotechnol-
ogy and desire of new emerging powers all pose real and perceived threats. Terrorist 
groups and U.S. adversaries have shown sophisticated ways and means to acquir-
ing technologies and necessary components to develop WMD and WME. PASCC 
research is looking at future threats from illicit nuclear trade in order to recommend 
policy actions that minimize these developments. Studies in this area include a deep 
look at the intent of perpetrators to acquire chemical and biological weapons from a 
behavioral	and	organizational	standpoint.	Anticipating	the	aftermath	of	a	potential	
collapse of the North Korean government is an example of PASCC’s future-oriented 
foresight	in	U.S.	readiness	to	address	both	technical	and	political	aftermath.
Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation Policy “The greatest threat to the U.S. 
and global security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear 
terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number 
of states” — this statement, made by President Obama in 2010, captures the essence 
of the issues facing U.S. nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy. Prevent-
ing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is one of the top priorities of the 
U.S. NPS is evaluating the intersections between policy and public opinion in an 
in-depth look at Japan. Another PASCC project is answering the question, what are 
the most promising ways to limit proliferation of sophisticated countermeasures to 
missile defenses, known as penetration aids. 
Strategic Dialogues Sponsored dialogues reflect U.S. defense and foreign policy 
strategies. Of the ten dialogues in fy12,	four	are	in	Asia,	five	are	in	Europe/Eurasia,	
and	one	is	in	Latin	America.	Discussions	are	structured	to	encompass	increased	
information sharing while furthering mutual understanding on policy-relevant is-
sues. These meetings identify misperceptions regarding each side’s nuclear strategy 
and	doctrine	and	highlight	potential	areas	of	cooperation	or	confidence	building	
measures.	Importantly,	PASCC	research	projects	often	directly	feed	into	the	sub-
stance of the dialogues. 
Track II dialogues create an unofficial setting for scholars, former officials, and other thought 
leaders to discuss security concerns and questions. The level of direct U.S. government involve-
ment in, or observation of, each dialogue varies from one dialogue to another. PASCC supports 
dialogues with U.S. allies, nuclear states, emerging powers, and countries in unstable regions. 
Some of the PASCC-funded dialogues have been taking place for many years while others are 
newly developed as a result of changes on the global stage. 
Summary Collectively awarded research studies and dialogues contribute to DTRA’s mission 
to safeguard the U.S. and its allies from the threats posed by chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) WMD, by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, 
and counter those threats and mitigate their effects. PASCC research provides long-term (5–20 
year) analytical perspectives to help DTRA leadership identify, plan, and persuasively communi-
cate what is needed to achieve strategic threat anticipation goals inherent in the agency’s mission.
The following table provides the name, performing organization, primary thrust area, and cost of 
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Pi,  PrOJECt PriMAry APPrOVED 
AFFiLiAtiOn titLE thruSt ArEA FunDing
Ackerman,	Gary,	UMD	START	 Anatomizing	the	Behavior	of	Chemical	 Countering	WMD/WME	 $642,806 
and	Victor	Asal,	CUNY	Albany	 and	Biological	Non-State	Adversaries	 	 (Years	1	and	2)
Albright,	David,		 Projecting	the	Future	World	of	 Countering	WMD/WME	 $158,610 
Institute	for	Science	and	 Illicit	Nuclear	Trade	and	 	  
International	Security	 Developing	Countermeasures
Bennett,	Bruce,	 Eliminating	North	Korean	WMD	 Countering	WMD/WME	 $244,457 
RAND	Corporation	 After	a	Government	Collapse	 	
Clement,	Victoria	and	 U.S.-Turkey	Strategic	Dialogue	 Strategic	Dialogue	 $255,033 
Ryan	Gingeras,	NPS	
Colby,	Elbridge	 The	1973	Yom	Kippur	War:	Nuclear	 21st	Century	Deterrence	 $225,000 
Center	for	Naval	Analyses	 Alerts	and	Strategic	Signaling	 	
Cossa,	Ralph	and	Brad	Glosserman	 Assurance	of	U.S.	Allies	 Strategic	Dialogue	 $289,799 
Pacific	Forum	CSIS	
Cossa,	Ralph	and	Brad	Glosserman	 U.S.-China	Nuclear	Dialogue	 Strategic	Dialogue	 $264,225 
Glosserman,	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	
Finlay,	Brian	 Managing	Across	Boundaries:	Promoting	 Anticipating	Threats	 $74,623 
Stimson	Center	 Private	Solutions	to	the	Proliferation	Threat	 and	Opportunities	 	
Hughes,	Kathryn	 International	Workshop	on	Trends	 Anticipating	Threats	and	 $104,579 
National	Academy	of		 in	Science	and	Technology	Relevant	 Opportunities 
Sciences	 to	the	Chemical	Weapons	Convention	 	
Kapur,	Paul,	NPS	 U.S.-India	Strategic	Dialogue	Phase	VII	 Strategic	Dialogue	 $241,308
Khan,	Feroz,	NPS	 Asian	Stability	Workshop		 Strategic	Dialogue	 $251,380
Knopf,	Jeffrey	W.,	NPS	and	 Rationality,	Culture,	and	Deterrence	 21st	Century	Deterrence	 $82,782 
and	the	Monterey	Institute	 
of	International	Studies	
Kosal,	Margaret,	 Military	Applications	of	 Anticipating	Threats	 $122,198 
Georgia	Institute	of		 Nanotechnology:	Implications	for	 and	Opportunities 
Technology	 Strategic	Cooperation	and	Conflict	 	
Krepon,	Michael,	Stimson	Center	 Space	and	Nuclear	Deterrence	 21st	Century	Deterrence	 $85,003
Lieber,	Keir,	Georgetown	 Coercive	Nuclear	Campaigns	in	the	 21st	Century	Deterrence	 $99,808 
University	and	Daryl	Press	 21st	Century:	Understanding 
Dartmouth	College	 Adversary	Options	and	Incentives
Lowenthal,	Micah,	National	 Security	Dialogue	with	China	 Strategic	Dialogue	 $250,000 
Academy	of	Sciences
Lowenthal,	Micah,	National	 Security	Dialogue	with	Russia	 Strategic	Dialogue	 $150,000 
Academy	of	Sciences
McMahon,	Scott		 Penaid	Nonproliferation:	New	 Nuclear	Weapons	and	 $403,235 
and	Richard	Speier	 Measures	to	Dissuade	WMD	 Nonproliferation	Policy	 (Tasks	1	and	2) 
RAND	Corporation	 Proliferation	and	Reinforce	Deterrence	 	 	
Moltz,	Clay,		 Assessing	the	Impact	of	Low	Nuclear	 Anticipating	Threats	 $185,316 
NPS	 Numbers	on	Strategic	Stability:		 and	Opportunities 
	 A	Regional	Analysis	 	























of researchers creates a powerhouse community of experts.
Pi,  PrOJECt PriMAry APPrOVED 
AFFiLiAtiOn titLE thruSt ArEA FunDing
Neureiter,	Norman,	American	 International	Biosecurity:		 Anticipating	Threats	 $237,138 
Association	for	the	Advancement	 Engagement	between	American	 and	Opportunities 
of	Science	(AAAS)	 and	MENA	Scientists
Payne,	Keith	and	Kurt	Guthe,	 Assuring	NATO-Europe	as	the	Role	 21st	Century	Deterrence	 $151,258 
National	Institute	for	 and	Number	of	U.S.	Nuclear	Weapons 
Public	Policy		 are	Reduced
Sagan,	Scott,	 Deterring	Rogue	Regimes:	Rethinking	 21st	Century	Deterrence	 $197,637 
Stanford	University	 Deterrence	Theory	and	Practice	
Trinkunas,	Harold	and		 U.S.	and	Brazilian	Perspectives	on	 Strategic	Dialogue	 $249,613 
Thomas	Bruneau,	NPS	 Global	and	Regional	Security
Tsypkin,	Mikhail,	 U.S.-Russian	Track	II	Workshop:		 Strategic	Dialogue	 $165,151 
NPS	 The	Future	of	Arms	Control	
Twomey,	Chris	and		 U.S.-China	Strategic	Lexicon	and	 Strategic	Dialogue	 $161,937 
Michael	Glosny,	NPS	 Concepts	Dialogue	
Weiner,	Rob,	NPS	and		 Strategic	Impact	of	Shifting	Nuclear	 Nuclear	Weapons	 $220,640 
Yuki	Tatsumi,	Stimson		 Consciousness	in	Japan	 and	Nonproliferation 
Center	(grant	for	$111,814)	 Phase	2:	Will	Populism	Destabilize		 Policy 
	 the	Nonnuclear	Status	Quo?	 	



















































The following PASCC reports were released during fy12. They are all publically accessible at www.hsdl.org. 
 
2012 001   U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VI: An NPS and Pacific Forum  
Conference, June 2011
2012 002  U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Partnership: A Track II Dialogue, October 2011
2012 003   Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II
2012 004   Resource Conflicts: Emerging Struggles Over Strategic Commodities  
in Latin America
2012 005   Reducing Insecurity in Africa: Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Military,  
U.S. Government and Non-Governmental Communities
2012 006  U.S.-ROK Dialogue, February 2012
2012 007  U.S.-Japan Dialogue, February 2012
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17-month period from May 2011 through Sep-
tember 2012. Initial funding for this seventeen-
month period covered the PASCC transition 
and start-up efforts as well as normal operations 
at	a	level	of	$1,817,795.	PASCC	operational	
costs are primarily labor for PASCC leadership 
and staff but also include NPS indirect charges, 
travel to PASCC meetings and events, and a 
small amount of equipment. 
Total costs for PASCC operations and infra-
structure through fy12 were less in actuality 
than initially budgeted. During execution in 
fy12,	the	PASCC	team	identified	an	amount	of	
operational savings that could be put toward ex-
ternal	research	awards—an	additional	$568,107.
Research funding for individual projects was transferred to PASCC in two iterations in No-
vember 2011 and January 2012. The total amount marked by DTRA for fy12–13 research was 
$5,729,000.	After	adding	the	savings	from	the	operations	budget,	the	total	amount	of	fy12 
funded research was $6,297,107. Individual project budgets ware described above but overall, as 
of the time of this publication, NPS-led research totaled $1,919,673 and externally-led research 
totaled	$4,260,816.	The	NPS	project	led	by	Rob	Weiner	included	an	external	grant	
to the Stimson Center. One project did not succeed in a grant award in fy12 due to 
performer capacity; those funds are being repurposed to an fy13 award as part of 
the next cycle of projects. 
CONCLUSION
DTRA is committed to continuing PASCC into fy13 and the out-years. PASCC is 
tasked with increasing outreach and dissemination of research products to gain 
increasing awareness, satisfaction, and results among USG stakeholders and the 
broader weapons of mass destruction and strategic community. 
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•  Space security
•  Nuclear proliferation 
and nonproliferation
•  Russian and Northeast 
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APPENDIX A:  




The Naval Postgraduate School’s Center on Contemporary Conflict is the research wing of the Department 
of National Security Affairs (NSA) and specializes in the study of international relations, security policy, and 
regional studies. The CCC houses the Project Advanced Systems and Concepts for Combating WMD (PASCC). 
PASCC is supporting research on behalf of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). 
DTRA’s mission is to safeguard the United States of America and its allies from the threats posed by chemi-
cal, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) WMD by providing capabilities to 
reduce, eliminate, and counter those threats and to mitigate their effects. PASCC provides long-term (5-20 
year) analytical perspectives to help DTRA leadership identify, plan, and persuasively communicate what is 
needed to achieve strategic threat anticipation goals inherent in the agency’s mission. PASCC emphasizes the 
identification,	integration,	and	further	development	of	strategic	thinking	and	analysis	on	the	most	intractable	
and future problems related to combating WMD and weapons of mass effects (WME). 
sCOPE
This Request for Ideas is an intramural and extramural endeavor focused on innovative and future-oriented 
research activities and related study efforts that advance state-of-the-art knowledge and understanding of 
overarching challenges for combating WMD/WME.
PuRPOsE
The	purpose	of	this	RFI	is	to	solicit	ideas	and	information	for	PASCC	program	requirements.	These	require-
ments are informed by the following goals:
PASCC seeks to cultivate interconnected, mutually supportive national and international strategic research 
community partnerships across all domains. This goal demonstrates our commitment to continue developing 
relationships and cooperative efforts within and understanding of the Global Security Environment (GSE). 
Objectives include developing new and expanding existing bilateral and multilateral engagements; supporting 
the cooperative prevention, control, and elimination of WMD/WME threats abroad; improving security and 
accountability of vulnerable nuclear, biological, and chemical material globally; strengthening interagency 
and international partnerships; improving strategic global situational awareness to respond to emerging 
threats and uncertainty; understanding social, political, and economic challenges and opportunities affecting 
WMD/WME proliferation, use, and response; and examining the potential for technological surprise (both its 
opportunities and challenges).
A	second	goal	is	to	bring	scientific,	technical	and	social	science	faculty/experts	to	look	well	into	the	future	
and help understand and anticipate WMD/WME capabilities to meet emerging and future threats and chal-
lenges. Objectives within this goal include improving the effectiveness of arms control and other cooperative 
arrangements as a means to prevent/counter proliferation and use of WMD/WME; enhancing Combatant 
Commanders’ ability to eliminate and respond to WMD/WME threats and vulnerabilities; providing opera-
tional and technical support for a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; developing a robust reach-back 



















ogy to detect, characterize, confront, defeat, protect against, mitigate and recover from the effects of the full 
spectrum of CBRNE and WME threats. This also includes examining operational and technical capabilities to 
improve WMD forensics and attribution.
REquEsT FOR IDEas FOR REsEaRCh anD TEChnOLOgy sTuDIEs  
TO COmbaT WmD anD WmE
PASCC solicits ideas for the development of innovative products that encourage new thinking, address current 
technology gaps, identify developing threats, and improve strategic and operational capabilities to respond to 
WMD/WME threats including, but not limited to: 
	 •	 	Research Thrust Area One: 21st Century Deterrence Research activities that focus on the new 
meaning of deterrence in the second nuclear age. This topic will examine deterrence of WMD/WME 
through an exploration of relevant strategies, operational/technical capabilities and actions, and 
combinations thereof that the United States may consider in order to discourage or prevent a broad 
spectrum of threats by potential adversaries, which the United States as well as its friends and allies 
may face in a dynamic security environment. 
	 •	  Research Thrust Area Two: Anticipating Threats and Opportunities Research projects and activities 
that analyze, model and forecast threats and opportunities across the spectrum of WMD, to include 
the dissection of proliferation forms and pathways, and the use of social science research and method-
ologies therein. This portfolio examines new and novel threats “over the horizon,” including innovative 
research projects that consider potential threat forms and technologies, alternative futures, so-called 
“black swans,” “bolts from the blue,” and other forms of strategic surprise, which include weapons 
of mass disruption. This portfolio also seeks to expand knowledge at the intersection of countering 
WMD	capabilities	with	cyber,	space,	and	other	concerns	in	the	global	commons.	Focus	areas	include	
the nexus of manmade and natural threats, the potential of new threat forms, the increasing influ-
ence of private and nongovernmental actors in the production and diffusion of technologies capable 
of mass destruction, effect and disruption and potential opportunities to counter these threats, while 
adhering to national and international standards of conduct.
	 •	 	Research Thrust Area Three: Countering WMD Proliferation and Terrorism Research that exam-
ines the nexus of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism. Research focuses on 
understanding various terrorist threats as well as the strategies and capabilities across the range of 
national power to prevent, dissuade and respond to terrorist groups that may seek WMD/WME.
	 •	 	Research Thrust Area Four: Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation Policy Research that examines 
existing and emerging nuclear weapons policies, nonproliferation activities, arms control, disarmament, 
pathways and the politico-economic and technical capabilities required to sustain these. This portfolio 
also examines the role of nuclear weapons in national security, sustainment of nuclear capabilities and 
strategies on the path to global zero and its potential implications for other strategic capabilities.
	 •	 	Research Thrust Area Five: Track II Strategic Dialogues on Threat Reduction As highlighted in the 
2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the US is pursuing high-level bilateral talks on strategic stability 
with Russia and China, which are aimed at fostering more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic 
relationships. Research projects in this area help to sustain these dialogues and establish similar infor-
mal	discussions	on	topics	of	mutual	interest	with	a	range	of	countries	along	the	Pacific	Rim	and	South	
Asia as well as other nations where the United States seeks to improve mutual understanding and build 














submIssIOn OF PROJECT IDEas
Those submitting project ideas should submit a one-page narrative explaining their project objective, back-
ground and assessed need, scope, deliverables and timeline, as well as biographies of principal investigators, 
as outlined in the attached template. Individuals belonging to formal governmental and nongovernmental 
institutions can submit multiple project ideas. They will be informed by June 15th of the status of their project 
recommendation. 
DEaDLInE
Project ideas are due by May 15, 2011.
aPPLICaTIOn PROCEDuREs























APPENDIX B:  
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS 
Anatomizing the behavior of Chemical and  
biological non-State Adversaries
 Performer:   University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START)
 Project Leads:  Gary Ackerman and Victor Asal
 Project Cost: $642,806
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Much attention has been paid to chemical and biological (CB) weapons over the last decade. Yet, 
relatively little attention has been paid to the characteristics, decision making, and behaviors of potential perpe-
trators. Given the high impact such weapons can have, it is crucial to make our analytical models of their use as 
accurate as possible. Policymakers and intelligence analysts can then more proactively identify attackers.
ObJECTIvE The START research team will explore in detail the potential CB terrorist (or criminal) adver-
sary from a behavioral and organizational standpoint, and develop means of identifying the most likely future 
CB perpetrators. As a consequence, both strategic and operational risk analysis and net assessment operators 






Projecting the Future World of illicit nuclear trade  
and Developing Countermeasures
 Performer: Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
 Project Lead:  David Albright
 Project Cost:  $158,610
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The WMD capabilities of adversarial state and non-state actors remain a clear and present 
danger to American and international security. Rarely are these capabilities developed solely indigenously. 
Instead,	sophisticated	and	often	well-hidden	illicit	trade	networks	funnel	WMD	materials	and	related	items	to	
interested buyers. Some networks have been destroyed or otherwise disabled; however, the ongoing diffusion 
of power throughout the globe means the threat remains.
ObJECTIvE The objective of the project is to produce a monograph evaluating the world of illicit nuclear 














ing covert nuclear programs, potentially delaying the development of nuclear programs of proliferant states, and 
providing more time for counter-WMD activities to succeed.
aPPROaCh ISIS will use a variety of research methodologies to produce the monograph, including the 
hosting of two expert, off-the-record workshops; one addressing emerging nuclear technologies and their 
national origins, and the other focused on characterizing future threats and developing countermeasures. Re-
searchers will determine which nations and actors are likely to become suppliers or facilitators to proliferant 
states, the expected technical methods to acquire nuclear weapons, and the states or non-state actors that will 
seek	or	spread	them.	Once	the	monograph	is	complete,	ISIS	briefings	to	U.S.	government	stakeholders	will	
recommend policy actions to minimize the threats posed by these developments.
Eliminating north Korean WMD After a government Collapse
 Performer:  RAND
 Project Leads:  Bruce Bennett
 Project Cost:  $244,457
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The	likelihood	of	a	sudden	North	Korean	collapse	has	risen	significantly	in	2012.	If	central	gov-
ernment control fails, individual commanders and others may decide to use or proliferate North Korean WMD. 
This type of scenario represents a multitude of threats to U.S. and regional security, including a heightened risk of 
nuclear	terrorism	and	the	spread	of	WMD	knowledge	to	other	rogue	states.	Despite	these	risks,	U.S.	Forces	Korea	
(USFK)	has	concluded	that	it	is	not	prepared	to	secure	North	Korean	WMD	in	the	expeditious	manner	that	is	
required during a sudden collapse.
ObJECTIvE Project lead Bruce Bennett will identify the various tasks that must be performed to locate 









 Performer:  NPS
 Project Lead:  Victoria Clement and Ryan Gingeras
 Project Cost:  $255,033
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Positioned on prime geostrategic real estate, Turkey pursues a foreign policy seeking zero problems 
with its neighbors, yet its neighborhood is increasingly menaced by conflict. The need for a U.S.-Turkey dialogue is 
forward looking. Turkey has become a role model for secular democracy in the Middle East, and as a NATO mem-



















ObJECTIvE The primary objectives of this effort are twofold: to better understand and identify solu-
tions to the current and potential challenges to U.S. national security interests in the Middle East, and to 
enhance understanding of and cooperation with Turkey through a Track II dialogue. The dialogue will 
provide policymakers with accessible intelligence, informed by on the ground discussions with relevant 
stakeholders in Turkey.
aPPROaCh Participants in the dialogue, slated to take place in Turkey, will serve as subject-matter ex-
perts and provide presentations, expertise, and/or consultation. Dialogue discussions will assess each nation’s 
perception of the regional security environment, the perceived value of extended deterrence, and the regional 
threat of WMD proliferation and how to encourage more active efforts to counter this danger. Insights gained 
will be circulated independently and without attribution, as well as being briefed to U.S. defense and diplo-
matic establishments.
the 1973 yom Kippur War: nuclear Alerts  
and Strategic Signaling
 Performer:  Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
 Project Leads:  Elbridge A. Colby
 Project Cost:  $225,000
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD In the lexicon of nuclear deterrence and crisis behavior, signaling features prominently as a 
tool of conveying critical information to adversaries and allies. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, both 
Israel and the United States raised the alert status of their nuclear forces in order to signal political resolve. 
Little	historical	research	regarding	the	use	of	nuclear	alerts	for	signaling	purposes	actually	exists.	With	
newly	declassified	material	available	though,	a	1973	Yom	Kippur	War	case	study	can	provide	useful	lessons	
for future nuclear crises.
ObJECTIvE CNA will research the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear signaling in the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War. Particular attention will be paid to why Israel and the U.S. relied on nuclear alerts and who the alerts in-
tended audiences were. Given the importance of nuclear alerts in crisis bargaining, this analysis will highlight 
the opportunities and dangers inherent in the use of such alerts.
aPPROaCh Instead of the theoretical and logic based arguments of previous studies on nuclear alerts, the 
produced	monograph	will	primarily	rely	on	recently	declassified	archival	material	from	the	Nixon	Admin-
















Assurance of u.S. Allies
 Performer:  Pacific Forum CSIS
 Project Leads:  Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
 Project Cost:  $289,800
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The	East	Asian	security	environment	is	entering	a	period	of	acute	uncertainty.	Leadership	
change in North Korea and Beijing’s increasingly militarized nationalism are occurring at the same time as 
the United States pushes for nuclear disarmament and budget cuts are reducing capability gaps in Asia. This 
confluence of events is leading some in South Korea and Japan to openly question the reliability of America’s 
nuclear umbrella—a disconnect quite troubling to advocates of regional stability.
ObJECTIvE The project’s main purpose is the reassurance of South Korea and Japan that the United 
States is committed to their defense and that our extended deterrent remains credible at a time of profound 
changes	in	Asia.	The	dialogues	hosted	by	the	Pacific	Forum	will	also	offer	a	chance	for	decision	makers	
from the United States, South Korea, and Japan to assess areas of further cooperation on nuclear deterrence 
and related subjects.
aPPROaCh Over	a	year,	the	Pacific	Forum	will	host	a	Track	II	bilateral	U.S.-South	Korean	Strategic	
Dialogue and a separate U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue. In addition, a one day mini-trilateral Japan-U.S.-South 
Korean	dialogue	will	be	held	to	discuss	opportunities	for	trilateral	cooperation.	Briefings	will	be	held	in	To-
kyo, Washington, and Seoul following the dialogues, and multi-lingual conference reports will be distributed.
u.S. China nuclear Dialogue
 Performer:  Pacific Forum CSIS
 Project Leads:  Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman
 Project Cost:  $264,225
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD An acknowledged weakness in China-US deliberations is the lack of official dialogue on nuclear 
weapons issues. Given the general lack of interaction and cooperation between security forces of the two coun-
tries, dialogue is needed to help moderate the US-China relationship, and to promote cooperation and transpar-
ency while increasing mutual understanding of shared interests in nonproliferation and nuclear security.
ObJECTIvE Pacific	Forum	CSIS	will	organize	and	host	a	Track	1.5	meeting	to	reduce	misperceptions	on	
both sides and help the two militaries and respective security specialists better understand the other’s policies 
and	concerns.	This	dialogue	and	the	NPS	Track	II	meeting	in	Hawaii	complement	and	build	from	one	another.
aPPROaCh Pacific	Forum	CSIS	will	select	approximately	20–25	multidisciplinary	experts	who	are	knowl-
edgeable about Asian regional nuclear weapons issues and their impact on national decision-making. Senior 
PLA	and	US	military	officers	will	be	invited	to	attend	in	their	private	capacities	or	as	observers.
This Track 1.5 dialogue will take place in Beijing and focus on practical and policy oriented issues related to 



















Managing Across boundaries: Promoting Private Solutions  
to the nonproliferation threat
 Performer:  The Stimson Center
 Project Leads:  Brian Finlay
 Project Cost:  $74,623
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD An array of private sector entities have begun to trouble security analysts who are concerned 
with the greater proportion of dual use technologies being pushed into private hands. The ability of industry 
to contribute — knowingly or unwittingly — to the WMD supply chain is surging. This challenge also pro-
vides an opportunity to develop innovative, public-private partnerships for proliferation prevention. Engage-
ment will be crucial, and can help create template “best practices” for WMD facilitator industries.
ObJECTIvE The initiative will study and engage with four distinct industry sectors on the pro- liferation 
supply	chain:	the	radiopharmaceutical	sector,	the	shipping	industry,	dual-use	technologies,	and	the	financial/
insurance sector. This effort, Partners in Prevention, will be an industry-led model to produce nonprolifera-
tion engagement more likely to be embraced by private actors across diverse industry sectors.
aPPROaCh The project will identify industry interests, capabilities, and responsibilities in preventing the 
movement of WMD and related items. Scalable initiatives that prevent proliferation through facilitator indus-
tries	will	be	identified	from	expert	workshops	with	industry.	The	Stimson	Center	will	summarize	the	findings	
of	the	workshops	and	provide	recommendations	in	a	report	and	briefings	to	relevant	Federal	agencies	as	well	
as to the public.
Workshop on trends in Science and technology  
relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention
 Performer:   The National Academies: Division on Earth and Life Studies
 Project Lead:  Kathryn J. Hughes
 Project Cost:  $104,579
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Every	five	years,	the	signatories	to	the	Chemical	Weapons	Convention	(CWC)	meet	to	consider	its	
implementation and enforcement. The third such conference is slated for 2013. In a constantly changing threat 
environment, there is a need to anticipate threats and further develop strategic thinking and analysis on chemi-
cal weapons and their use.
ObJECTIvE In order to prepare positions and topics of discussion for the 2013 CWC conference, The Na-
tional	Academies:	Division	on	Earth	and	Life	Studies	will	hold	a	workshop	prior	to	the	conference.	This	will	
provide	an	opportunity	for	necessary	technical	discussions	and	scientific	input	concerning	evolving	efforts	in	
the nonproliferation of chemical weapons.
aPPROaCh A three day international conference will be held, and its proceedings communicated in a 
follow-on	report	and	briefings	to	the	U.S.	government	community.	The	approximately	75	attendees	will	be	
drawn	from	the	scientific	community,	chemical	enterprises,	and	relevant	government	agencies	in	developed	and	
developing states. As a result of the decreasing focus on the destruction of chemical weapons, particular atten-














u.S.-india Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vii
 Performer:  NPS
 Project Lead:  S. Paul Kapur
 Project Cost:  $241,308
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The United States and India consider themselves strategic partners. In India, the United States 
finds	shared	interests	in	managing	China’s	rise,	combatting	terrorism,	avoiding	the	outbreak	of	Indo-Pakistani	
war, and pursuing nuclear nonproliferation. The newness of this partnership though means that uncertainties 
remain in the extent and durability of U.S.-India shared interests.
ObJECTIvE The 2012 Strategic Dialogue will provide an important forum to elucidate and resolve these 
uncertainties. This conference will examine the current state and future trajectory of U.S.-India strategic rela-
tions, particularly as they pertain to the likelihood of nuclear proliferation or confrontation in South Asia. 
The conference will mitigate the potential for misunderstanding between the two sides, and see that opportu-
nities for joint gains are not easily squandered.
aPPROaCh In coordination with an Indian think-tank, NPS will hold the two-day meeting in New Delhi. 
It	will	bring	together	experts	in	the	fields	of	diplomacy,	the	military,	journalism,	and	academia	for	a	series	of	




 Performer:  NPS
 Project Lead: Feroz H. Khan
 Project Cost:  $251,350
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD As	the	United	States	begins	its	strategic	pivot	to	the	Pacific,	there	exists	a	deepening	need	to	
bridge communication gaps, nurture détente, and highlight areas of cooperation with and among Asian coun-
tries. To that end, a deeper understanding of threat perceptions among Asian states and roles of the interna-
tional community in promoting regional stability is needed.
ObJECTIvE NPS will organize a workshop to discuss overarching concerns related to stability in Asia. 
The workshop and follow-on reports will help provide prescriptions to build strategic stability, WMD arms 
control, and global cooperation.
aPPROaCh Experts on Asian security matters will be invited for a three day workshop. The workshop will 





















rationality, Culture, and Deterrence
 Performer:  NPS and the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
 Project Lead:  Jeffrey W. Knopf
 Project Cost:  $82,782






ObJECTIvE The project lead Jeffrey Knopf will explore alternative frameworks for understanding what 
drives the foreign policy decisions of states. The research will seek to identify and integrate different bodies of 
relevant existing scholarship and to assess the implications for deterrence planning and operations.
aPPROaCh This academic effort will provide a review of the existing dominant approaches, and judge the 
strengths and weaknesses of their alternatives. Newly relevant psychological and neuroscience frameworks 
will	receive	special	attention.	A	written	paper	summarizing	the	project	lead’s	findings	will	be	the	prime	deliv-
erable;	briefings	to	various	agencies	and	Combatant	Commands	will	provide	a	more	comprehensive	approach	
to understanding decision making.
Military Applications of nanotechnology:  
implications for Strategic Cooperation and Conflict
 Performer:   Georgia Tech, Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy
 Project Lead:  Margaret E. Kosal
 Project Cost:  $122,198
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD With over $1.6 billion invested annually, it is clear that the U.S. government has embraced 
nanotechnology. We are not alone though. Russia, Turkey, Israel, Iran, and China are aggressively pursu-
ing similar research. Commentary on the matter tends to focus on non-defense issues; those few that have 
contain glaring disconnects between technical capability and limitation or offensive intentions. To assess the 
dangers and opportunities arising from emerging nanotechnology and nanotechnology-enabled weapons, a 
comprehensive analytical outlook is needed.
ObJECTIvE The project will advance critical thinking on the potential role and impact of nanotechnology 
on defense policy. It will view nanotechnology through the prism of international cooperation and competi-
tion, examining whether emerging nanotechnology will exacerbate or mitigate regional security challenges.
aPPROaCh Research will focus on the national approaches and capacities for advancing nano-technology 
military applications. This includes offensive versus defensive force postures and operations, the formation of 
incentives among competitors, the strategic conditions under which conflict or cooperation will prevail, and 
















Space and nuclear Deterrence
 Performer:  The Stimson Center
 Project Lead:  Michael Krepon
 Project Cost:  $85,003
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Analytical product related to space deterrence is sparse and yet U.S. dependency on space as-
sets for national and economic security is growing. Interest and capabilities related to space denial and space 
deterrence are also growing, particularly in China and Russia.
ObJECTIvE The project lead Michael Krepon will convene a Distinguished Advisory Group to sharpen 
and address questions such as: What key elements of nuclear deterrence are most applicable to space deter-
rence?	What	key	elements	are	least	applicable?	Is	the	concept	of	extended	deterrence	also	applicable	to	space?	
What	declaratory,	testing,	deployment,	or	diplomatic	policies	are	most	likely	to	strengthen	space	deterrence?




The project will produce commissioned essays and a monograph highlighting areas of consensus, disagree-
ment, and subjects deserving of additional analytical focus.
Coercive nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century: 
understanding Adversary incentives and Options  
for nuclear Escalation
 Performer:  Georgetown University and Dartmouth College
 Project Leads:  Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
 Project Cost:  $99,808
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Since the Cold War’s end, the United States has maintained a conventional force far superior to 
any potential enemy. This fact has driven adversaries to unconventional tactics, but what happens if a weaker 
adversary	has	nuclear	capabilities?	Coercive	escalatory	incentives	for	nuclear	weapon	use	do	exist	for	weaker	
adversaries in conflict with America. There is a need for a comprehensive understanding of the strategic 
alternatives of weak nuclear weapon states. In East Asia and the Middle East the United States faces related 
strategic predicaments, and thus this project will provide much needed analysis.
ObJECTIvE The project leads will examine why and how regional powers armed with nuclear weapons may 
employ	them	coercively	during	a	conventional	war.	More	specifically,	a	set	of	research	questions	will	provide	
insight on the paths of nuclear escalation, weak state strategies of coercive escalation, and the type of targets 
regional powers may strike to pursue escalatory strategies.
aPPROaCh The	central	deliverable	will	be	a	final	written	report	and	a	set	of	briefing	slides.	The	monograph	
will rely on a mining of literature on escalation during crises and wars, and analyze a set of research questions 



















A national Academy of Sciences nuclear Security Dialogue 
with China
 Performer:   National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security  
and Arms Control (CISAC)
 Project Leads:  Micah D. Lowenthal
 Project Cost: $250,000
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD China is both a strategic partner and potential adversary of the United States. While many 
dialogues between the two countries can suffer from the perennial disruptions of Sino-U.S. ties, previous 
National Academy of Sciences dialogues have not. This is due to their technical focus and nongovernmental 
nature. Keeping the lines of communication open in this way gives U.S. policymakers an informal link to 
China’s technical community of nuclear-weapon laboratories that advise Beijing.
ObJECTIvE The project aims to hold Track II dialogue meetings between a National Academy of Sciences 
group and a counterpart group in China, on technical aspects of security issues, particularly nuclear security. 
The meetings among technical, military, and policy experts address arms control problems from a technical 
perspective and identify the most promising opportunities for collaboration through official channels.
aPPROaCh The products of the dialogue are the ideas and perspectives shared with the countries’ respec-
tive	governments	through	briefings.	This	year’s	dialogue	will	examine	technical	aspects	of	the	Comprehensive	
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, nuclear terrorism, technical issues related to interdicted nuclear material, the P5 nuclear 
security glossary effort, and regional security and nonproliferation in South Asia and the Korean Peninsula.
national Academy of Sciences nuclear Security Dialogue  
with russia
 Performer:   National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security  
and Arms Control (CISAC)
 Project Leads:  Micah D. Lowenthal
 Project Cost: $150,000
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the importance of strategic dialogue on nuclear 
issues with Russia, and while New START has created some space for formal dialogue, more informal engage-
ment is needed. It is quite unlikely that formal negotiations will occur between the United States and Russia 
on	nuclear	arms	control	until	after	both	nations’	elections.	The	lines	of	communication	must	be	kept	open	
though, and the current pause is an opportunity to lay a foundation for formal negotiations that may follow.
ObJECTIvE CISAC enables a unique Track II dialogue among technical, military, and policy experts that 
addresses	arms	control	problems	from	a	technical	perspective,	and	identifies	the	most	promising	opportunities	
for collaboration via official channels. The overall goal of the dialogue is the maintenance and reinforcement of a 
resilient and transparent strategic stability with Russia.

















tegic nuclear weapons; the monitoring and safeguarding of nuclear materials; and efforts to prevent nuclear 
terrorism.	CISAC	will	release	post-dialogue	briefings	and	a	report
Penaid nonproliferation: new Measures to Dissuade  
WMD Proliferation and reinforce Deterrence
 Performer:  RAND
 Project Leads:  K. Scott McMahon and Richard Speier
 Project Cost: $403,235
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Reductions in the U.S. nuclear deterrent may have to be offset in the future by an increased reli-
ance on missile defenses. Potential adversaries recognize this, and thus we see an increased proliferation of 
sophisticated	countermeasures	to	missile	defenses	(also	known	as	penetration	aids	and	hereafter	referred	to	as	
penaids). The United States is concerned with the spread of penaids to North Korea and Iran, and even more 
concerned with who is developing these penaids for export, namely Russia and China. A timely nonproliferation 
initiative may reduce the impending penaid threat.
ObJECTIvE To reduce the impending threat, the project will inform U.S. policymakers on the penaid tech-
nologies of greatest concern and discuss potential policies to restrict them. By so doing, RAND can assist U.S. 
agencies in discouraging WMD proliferation and strengthening deterrence.
aPPROaCh Four	overarching	questions	will	guide	the	research:	What	technologies	and	equip-	ment,	if	





Assessing the impact of Low nuclear numbers  
on Strategic Stability: A regional Analysis
 Performer:   NPS
 Project Leads:  James Clay Moltz
 Project Cost: $185,316
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD In Europe and East Asia there is growing concern regarding U.S. assertions to reduce our nuclear deter-
rent force. Thus, while U.S. rhetoric on “zero nuclear weapons” is appealing at a global level, considerably more work 
is required at the regional level to even begin to approach such conditions. Up until now deductive logic has been the 
only tool used to analyze reductions. An important requirement for further nuclear arms reductions is a more compre-




















ObJECTIvE Project lead James Moltz will identify the potential problems of low nuclear numbers on a 
region-by-region basis, and develop policy recommendations for decision makers faced with a goal of lower-
ing nuclear numbers in various geographic regions.
aPPROaCh The report will analyze the impact of cuts in U.S. nuclear forces under conditions of scaled re-
ductions to levels of 1,000, 500, and 100 deployed strategic weapons. It will rely on the expertise of experts in 
European, Northeast Asian, South Asian, and Middle Eastern regional nuclear dynamics. An internal work-
shop	will	be	held	at	NPS	for	project	experts	to	review	and	discuss	findings,	before	a	final	workshop	is	held	at	
the Pentagon and the report is published.
European trilateral nuclear Dialogue
 Performer:  Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
 Project Leads:  Clark Murdock and Frank Miller
 Project Cost:  $264,225
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The	P-3,	consisting	of	France,	Great	Britain,	and	the	U.S.,	face	a	combination	of	pressure	on	de-
fense budgets and renewed emphasis on a world without nuclear weapons. In this context, the potential increas-
es	for	infighting	among	allies	on	nuclear	issues.	Additionally,	as	France	is	not	a	member	of	the	Nuclear	Planning	
Group in NATO, no candid formal forum exists to collaborate among the P-3 on nuclear issues within NATO. 
The increasingly uncertain strategic environment necessitates a higher level of P-3 coordination.
ObJECTIvE The Trilateral Nuclear Dialogues organized by CSIS have a track-record of convening suc-
cessful and candid meetings that provide policymakers with insights and recommendations that contribute to 
P-3 unity on nuclear issues. In addition to building unity and sense of purpose among the P-3, the organized 
dialogues work to promote cooperative nonproliferation efforts and enhance scholarship on the challenges 
these critical allies face.
aPPROaCh Three	trilateral	dialogues	will	be	held	in	London,	Paris,	and	Washington,	DC.	The	actual	meet-
ings are at the Track 1.5 level due to the participation of high-level government representatives; still, consensus 
policy statements signed solely by the Track 2 participants will be fashioned. Discussions will include NATO’s 
nuclear deterrence posture vis-à-vis a nuclear Iran, P-3 positions on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and 
future threats in the space and cyber realm.
international biosecurity: Engagement between  
American and MEnA Scientists
 Performer:   American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS),  
Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy (CSTSP)
 Project Lead:  Norman Neureiter 
 Project Cost:  $237,138
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Many in the security and terrorism studies community are concerned with the diffusion of biolog-















response programs. There is unmet need for such efforts in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, 
where states have increased funding for the biological sciences at the same time as the Arab Spring generates 
uncertainty and insecurity.
ObJECTIvE CSTSP	will	provide	guidance	concerning	the	development	of	scientific	engagement	ap-
proaches to MENA countries. This will encourage partnerships on bio-surveillance or infectious disease 
response	between	the	United	States	and	regional	scientific	stakeholders	and	address	gaps	in	scientific	engage-
ment initiatives in the region across U.S. agencies.
aPPROaCh Two 2-day meetings will be held in North Africa and the Middle East with influential sci-
entists who work on infectious disease research, biosurveillance and response, and laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity.	AAAS	will	also	issue	two	small,	collaborative	sub-grants	for	scientific	engagement.	Final	reports	
will identify regional security and capability gaps, effective methods of increasing biosecurity training, and 
areas for further biosecurity cooperation.
Assuring nAtO-Europe as the role and number of u.S. nuclear 
Weapons are reduced
 Performer:  National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP)
 Project Leads:  Keith Payne and Kurt R. Guthe
 Project Cost:  $151,258
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The U.S. nuclear deterrent is in a state of flux. Nuclear modernization plans are on hold, the cur-
rent administration is pushing for further weapon reductions, and even our NATO allies are reconsidering the 
status of their nuclear deterrents. Given these and other developments, NATO members are understandably 
concerned with a potential weakening of America’s “supreme guarantee” of extended deterrence. The question 
is	what	specific	means	can	reassure	NATO	that	the	U.S.	nuclear	deterrent	remains	credible?
ObJECTIvE The project will examine steps the United States can take to ensure the credibility of its securi-
ty commitments to allies in Europe, as reductions in the role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons are pursued 
in the years ahead.
aPPROaCh The report produced for the project will delineate the views of key NATO allies regarding is-
sues that bear on the credibility of U.S. commitments. Where the analy- sis uncovers areas of allied concern, the 
report will provide options, nonmilitary as well as military, which national security decision makers might use 
to	maintain	or	strengthen	allied	confidence.	The	NIPP	will	produce	commissioned	essays	and	a	monograph	that	



















Deterring rogue regimes: rethinking Deterrence theory  
and Practice
 Performer:   Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation
 Project Lead:  Scott D. Sagan
 Project Cost:  $197,637
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Many theories on nuclear weapons and deterrence were developed with the USSR in mind. 
Today, nuclear armed rogue states are the persistent threat. Traditional deterrence theory relies on an accu-
rate	understanding	of	an	adversary’s	cost-benefit	calculus,	but	rogue	regimes	consistently	do	not	behave	as	
predicted. Instead of relying on a potentially outdated logic, the wealth of newly available documents from 
Saddam	Hussein’s	Iraq	is	an	opportunity	to	develop	a	candid	understanding	of	how	rogue	regimes	truly	oper-
ate within the domain of deterrence theory.
ObJECTIvE The objective of this research project is to re-evaluate traditional deterrence theory and 
practice in light of the threats posed from rogue regimes by examining new evidence on decision-making in 
Saddam	Hussein’s	Iraq.	This	will	provide	comparative	lessons	for	U.S.	deterrence	policy	regarding	new	and	
existing rogue regimes seeking nuclear weapons.
aPPROaCh The research will culminate in a workshop held in the Middle East with former U.S. officials, 
former	senior	members	of	Iraq’s	Revolutionary	Guard	Corps,	and	several	members	of	Saddam	Hussein’s	inner	
circle. The workshop and follow-on report will center efforts on understanding Iraqi decision-making regard-
ing WMD, and American and Iraqi perceptions of each other’s military intentions and capabilities throughout 
the	Saddam	era.	From	this,	lessons	for	future	U.S.	policy	toward	rogue	regimes	can	be	ascertained.
2012 u.S. and brazilian Perspectives on global  
and regional Security
 Performer:  NPS
 Project Leads:  Harold Trinkunas and Thomas Bruneau
 Project Cost: $249,613
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The need for a workshop with Brazil is compelling given the growing importance of Brazil as 
a	global	power	—	a	state	that	has	achieved	significant	mastery	of	nuclear	technology	and	is	a	contributor	to	
global non-proliferation. Brazil is one of the few countries to have mastered the complete nuclear fuel cycle. 
It	is	able	to	export	significant	nuclear	technologies,	yet	it	is	also	critical	of	aspects	of	the	international	nuclear	
nonproliferation regime as it now stands. This workshop will deepen mutual understanding of the ways in 
which each nation views its most critical security concerns and the domestic debates that shape those views.
ObJECTIvE The workshop will discuss ways in which to diminish the threat of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, promote international non-proliferation, and address regional security in the Americas by informing the 
decision-making of defense and diplomatic policymakers in both countries. The two-day event will be held in 
Brasilia, Brazil, and will bring together approximately 15 academics, former military officers, former defense 
officials, and former diplomats that specialize in international security, U.S.-Brazil relations, global non-pro-















issues of mutual interest related to each state’s national security in an off the record venue. The questions 
addressed by subject matter experts will include: clarifying views on U.S.-Brazil relations during the Obama 
administrations; exploring U.S. and Brazil’s current international strategies; understanding U.S. and Brazil’s 
visions on international non-proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons as well 
as sensitive nuclear technology; and discussing possible solutions to current and potential regional and global 
challenges	to	U.S.	and	Brazil’s	national	security	interests.	NPS	will	produce	a	final	report	and	brief	US	govern-
ment officials in the region and in Washington.
u.S.-russian Strategic Dialogue: the Future of Arms Control
 Performer:  NPS
 Project Lead:  Mikhail Tsypkin
 Project Cost:  $165,151
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The path to further nuclear weapon reductions remains clouded at the moment and Russia and 
the United States still retain the ability to unleash global destruction. Despite the success of the New START 
treaty, the recent decision by Moscow to plow ahead with a new heavy MIRV ICBM is reversing strategic sta-
bility, and is emblematic of the inability of Russian and American experts to meet eye to eye on arms control. 
This widening gap necessitates efforts to identify and build upon areas of potential cooperation and agree-
ment through continued and vigorous dialogue.
ObJECTIvE NPS will conduct a U.S.-Russian workshop on future directions and goals of the arms control 
process,	to	find,	in	cooperation	with	Russian	experts,	possible	ways	for	a	further	reduction	of	dangers	inher-
ent in the existing arsenals. Of special note will be discussions on joint U.S.-Russia modeling of strategic 
stability under various arms control/reductions regimes.
aPPROaCh The workshop will bring together a group of Russian and American experts and government 
officials. Primary focus areas will be missile defense, methodology for nuclear weapon proliferation threat as-
sessments, joint strategic stability modeling, and nuclear force reductions. The project aims to produce a report 
based on the workshop proceedings, with concrete policy recommendations for the U.S. government regarding 
the future paths to U.S.-Russian and multilateral nuclear arms reductions.
u.S. China Strategic Dialogue
 Performer: NPS
 Project Leads: Christopher Twomey and Michael Glosny
 Project Cost:  $161,937
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The Sino-American relationship is perhaps the most important security issue of the 21st cen-
tury. As the regional and global activities of both countries come into increasingly closer contact, there is a 
greater chance of escalation during a crisis. Misunderstanding in the nuclear and strategic realm could lead 
to catastrophic inadvertent escalation, whereas deeper mutual understanding could enhance stability and 




















ObJECTIvE Now in its seventh iteration, NPS will organize and host a Track-II meeting to deepen under-
standing of Chinese and American commonalities and differences on strategic and nuclear terms and concepts. 
This	dialogue	and	the	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	Track	1.5	meeting	in	Beijing	complement	and	build	from	one	another.
aPPROaCh The Track-II meeting will include approximately eight Chinese participants and 20 American 
participants. NPS will develop a list of potential topics and concepts based on discussions at the 2011 meet-
ing, follow-up discussions with USG officials and both Chinese and America experts, as well as short com-
missioned memos from both Chinese and American contributors. NPS will lead a dialogue in the summer of 
2012,	followed	by	briefings	and	a	report	to	U.S.	government	stakeholders.
Strategic impact of Shifting nuclear Security  
Consciousness in Japan, Phase 2
 Performer:  NPS; The Stimson Center
 Project Lead:  Robert J. Weiner and Yuki Tatsumi
 Project Cost:  $220,640
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD Japan and the United States are crucial security partners. Since the two countries’ signing of 
their Mutual Security Treaty in 1951, Japan has hosted U.S. military bases critical to U.S. strategic inter-
ests	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region	and	beyond.	In	return,	the	U.S.	has	committed	itself	to	defend	Japan	from	
external aggression. In the area of nuclear weapons, however, Japan’s alliance relationship with the United 
States has always been an uneasy one. In recent years, this tension has grown only more complex. Changing 
public attitudes and the emergence of new threats have begun to open a once-taboo dialogue about Japan’s 
own nuclear capabilities.
ObJECTIvE This project extends research completed during Phase I to ask, “Will populism and natural 
disaster	destabilize	the	US-Japan	nuclear	bargain?”	NPS	aims	to	fill	an	important	gap	in	existing	research	by	
assessing the volatility of Japanese public opinion toward nuclear power and weapons; the degree to which 
this influences (or is influenced by) Japanese security policymakers; the resulting impact on the likelihood Ja-
pan	will	maintain	its	“strategically	rational”	nonnuclear	policy	stance	and	on	its	confidence	in	the	US	alliance;	
and	“red	flag”	indicators	and	leverage	points	that	allow	the	U.S.	to	detect	and	respond	to	shifts	in	these	factors.
aPPROaCh NPS, collaborating with The Stimson Center, will perform qualitative research using primary 



















interpreting and implementing nAtO’s Deterrence  
and Defense Posture
 Performer:  NPS
 Project Lead:  David Yost
 Project Cost:  $185,929
 Fiscal Year(s):  2012–2013
DEmanD The	NATO	Deterrence	and	Defense	Posture	Review	(DDPR),	set	to	be	ratified	at	the	Alliance	
Summit in Chicago in May 2012, assesses NATO’s nuclear posture, missile defense capabilities, and conven-
tional forces, as well as WMD and missile proliferation threats. The DDPR enables NATO to identify the 
capabilities	and	policies	necessary	to	effectively	meet	future	security	challenges.	After	the	Chicago	Summit,	it	
will be critical for Alliance members to engage in constructive dialogue and problem-solving in relation to the 
DDPR conclusions.
ObJECTIvE NPS, in cooperation with the NATO Defense College and NATO Nuclear Policy Directorate, 
will organize a workshop to clarify, reinforce, and carry forward the deterrence and defense posture decisions 
made at the May 2012 Chicago Summit. The workshop, in its seventh year running, will foster enhanced com-
munication, cooperation, and rapport among NATO members.
aPPROaCh The two-day workshop will host approximately 60 participants at the NATO Defense College in 
Rome, Italy, and focus on the interpretation and implementation of the DDPR. Two keynote speakers will frame 
the	workshop	with	speeches	on	“smart	defense”	and	on	the	Alliance’s	deterrence	and	defense	posture.	Following	
the	workshop	a	final	report	detailing	the	workshop’s	proceedings	and	findings	will	be	made	available.
1 UNIVERSITY CIRCLE    MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943    831.656.1068    WWW.NPS.EDU
